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1.    INTRODUCTION
“Change, risk, and uncertainty are the three basic, linked com-
ponents that need to be managed” (Green 2003).  Risk manage-
ment is a process in time that implies choices under uncertainties
made for matching often-conflicting objectives, most parameters
of the process changing with time.  Management choices also
affect change, the main consequences of disasters are changes.
Changes, risks, and uncertainties also derive from choices and
actions made by multiple actors.  Their implications range from
local to global scales.  The differential rate of changes in environ-
mental and sociotechnical systems and consequent mismatches are
factors that contribute to risk.  Without pretending to be exhaus-
tive, this overview primarily develops issues emerging from the
annual multidisciplinary forum on Integrated Disaster Risk
Management (IDRM) by the IIASA and DPRI (Disaster
Prevention Research Institute), Kyoto University. 
2.    CLIMATE CHANGE AND EXTREME EVENTS
Extreme atmospheric events resulting in hurricanes, wind-
storms, tornadoes, droughts, fires, floods and other weather-related
disasters account for a large proportion of the increased losses
from natural disasters over the last decades.  More alarming even
than the size of past losses is the trend for losses to increase.  More
than 1.5 million people died in the past two decades because of cli-
matic events, and more than ninety percent of those deaths have
occurred in developing countries (Red Cross, 2002; Munich Re,
2003).  How do these events correlate with global warming?  Can
increased weather variability, in the form of droughts, windstorms,
floods, hurricanes, and other weather-related extremes be more
disruptive than the consequences of higher average surface temper-
atures and related average weather conditions? 
Scientists more frequently are asking such questions, and the
media propagating them, sometimes as established truths.  For a
long time, the research agenda on global climate change has been
concerned essentially with the foreseeable effects of average tem-
perature-increase and precipitation regime.  Much less emphasis
has been placed on weather variability (MacDonald 1998, 1999).
At the same time, research on natural hazards seems to have pro-
ceeded independent of the climate change community.  At the last
IIASA-DPRI Forum in 2004, it was apparent that “there is not
enough exchange and sharing between climate change researchers
and policy makers and their counterparts working on natural haz-
ards, especially flood and drought” (Wisner, 2004).
Bridging the gap between research on global climate change
and natural hazard has been among the objectives of IIASA activi-
ties, since Mac Donald (1998, 1999) focused attention on the fact
that a small increase in water surface temperatures would lead to
increased atmospheric water contents  and thereby to possible
higher precipitation and, in some regions, more frequent flooding.
The spatial scales of the most extreme events, however, are much
too small to be captured by current climate models.  He also
warned that the clustering of frequencies of extreme climatic
events, in relation to fluctuation in sea surface temperature (such as
ENSO), might have very important economic and financial conse-
quences.  He questioned whether these fluctuations are affected by
global warming. 
The roles of global warming and human interventions in
hydrological and economic systems were approached in 1999 at a
conference on Global Change and Flood Risks in Europe held at
IIASA  (see collection of papers in Linnerooth-Bayer and
Amendola, 2003).  Bronstert’s (2003) review of research on cli-
mate change and European flood risks showed conflicting evi-
dence of a correlation between climate warming and more inten-
sive, frequent flooding in some European regions and no correla-
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tion in others.  The difficulties and uncertainties involved in sepa-
rating the effects of global warming from the many other human-
induced factors that influence the frequency and intensity of flood
events and resulting losses appeared to be overwhelming owing to
model limitations and the unknowns inherent in scientific investi-
gations.  Similar results on the relationship between global warm-
ing and riverine flooding were published by Milly et al.; Palmer
and Rälsänen; and Schnur, in the journal Nature in 2002.  They
indicate that global warming may have increased the risk of flood-
ing in selected, very large river basins, but they also point out the
limitations of available climate models which do not have a resolu-
tion fine enough for accurate application at the river-basin level
and to the large and inherent  uncertainties.
Based on the UN’s International Panel on Climate Change
conclusions that, though there are uncertainties, some extreme
events are projected to increase in frequency and/or severity due to
changes in the mean and/or variability of climate (IPGC, 2001),
increased research efforts and better interaction with the natural
hazards research community were to be expected. 
The 3rd IIASA-DPRI Forum again attempted to analyze the
relationships between global warming and weather-related disas-
ters.  No significant change in assessment capability based on the
available predictive models emerged in the comprehensive presen-
tation of Ikebuchi (2003).  Nor could the 2002 catastrophic Elbe
floods in Europe be related with global warming in Nachtnebel’s
report (2003).  He concluded that research on possible links of
flood risk to climate change should be pursued, but that it is more
urgent to improve flood forecasting tools (indeed only one of the
two severe rainfall events provoking the Elbe disaster could be
predicted by forecasting systems) and non structural measures such
as land use control and insurance.
Whereas a causal link between global warming and flooding
remains speculative, Kaczmarek (2003) gave evidence of impor-
tant links in Europe between the temperature cycles of the
European weather and North Atlantic Ocean Oscillation (NAO).
NAO as ENSO is a recurrent oceanic phenomenon associated with
variations in “normal” climatic variability, providing new climatic
resource opportunities and hazards.  “Questions exist today as to
whether the recurrence and intensity of these phenomena are being
affected by the forces pushing Global Climate Change.  This is as
yet a mute point” (Lavell, 2004)
We are again at a point of departure in our short review.
There appear to be good reasons to worry about future intensifica-
tion of climatic extremes, but “we simply do not know” (Green,
2003).  Stronger interaction between the two types of research
communities is crucial.  From this interaction the need for stronger
mitigation efforts by reducing greenhouse emissions might be
determined as well as inputs for more effective adaptation to cli-
mate changes.  In any case, the projected sea level rise would
aggravate the consequence of storms, hurricanes, floods, and
tsunami even if their frequencies and intensities do not change.
Under this uncertainty about the future, what choices should
we make, and what decisional criteria should apply? In the pres-
ence of high uncertainties and ignorance, as Green states, cost ben-
efit analyses based on probability distributions (recurrence times)
are useless.  Moreover, Green states that “the critical form of
uncertainty is doubt which is removed to the extent that we can
become confident that one option should be preferred to all others”
and that “confidence is conceptually quite different to probability”.
He introduces a fuzzy distribution for the concept “confidence”;
but, if probability is not useful, then even fuzzy measures of uncer-
tainties/certainties are useless.  The latter introduce a number of
new problems (even mathematical ones as there is no universally
accepted set of operations that can be used with them) which add
further subjectivity with respect to the already subjective meaning
of probability.  Neither the Bayesan probability scale used by the
IPCC nor its translation into qualitative statements (Weiss, 2004)
is useful for framing decisions; rather, they are possibly useful for
risk communication.  We are confronted with risks characterized
by very severe consequences, irreversibility (at least in medium
time), and very uncertain occurrences.  In order to develop robust
defense strategies, attempts to characterize uncertainty such as the
Assess-Risk-of-Policy Framework (Lempert et al. 2004) that do not
depend on expert consensus on probabilities might be helpful.
Characterizing uncertainties is not contrary to what should be the
guiding principle in such a case, i.e. a precautionary approach1;
and, equity and efficiency should characterize any strategy taken
for the adaptive measures (Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola,
2000). 
Precaution and equity therefore seem to have inspired the
IPCC report on changing the politics and discourse of catastrophic
weather by the tacit recognition that northern hemisphere countries
are, or will be, contributing to weather-extreme losses in the devel-
oping world2. In response, climate-change negotiators have called
upon parties to “consider” actions to meet the specific needs and
concerns of developing countries with respect to the adverse
impacts of climate change; e.g. the UNFCCC Climate Impact
Relief Fund for weather-related disasters.  As Linnerooth-Bayer
(2003) discusses, the northern hemisphere countries could absorb a
portion of the losses from weather-related disasters in the develop-
ing world by offering support for national insurance schemes in the
form of backup systems for national public-private insurance,
micro-insurance schemes, and government insurance for public
infrastructure losses.  Ex-ante financial instruments such as
“Charity Catastrophe Bonds” also would offer complementary
opportunities (Woo, 2001).
If climate change may affect future patterns of weather
extremes, “normal climatic variability in the form of the ENSO
cycle and inter-annual variability is already a great challenge”
(Wisner 2004).  Resilience to disasters should be established by
medium and long-term risk management schemes (Lavell, 2004).
The unavailability of ex-ante financial measures can set back eco-
nomic development, depending on the size of a single catastrophic
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“Rather than seeing ‘precaution’ as being in tension with ‘science based
regulation’, research… …suggests that key elements of a precautionary
approach are entirely consistent with sound scientific practice in respond-
ing to intractable problems in risk assessment such as ignorance”
(Stirling, 1999). 
2 Catastrophes and poverty were an early concern of IIASA activities  (see
the special issue of IIASA Options  http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/INF/
OPT/Spring98/index.htm) which concern was reinforced after the devas-
tating effects of the Hurricane Mitch (see  http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Admin/
INF/OPT/Winter99/options-fw99.pdf) when NGOs openly raised the
question of holding the “North” accountable for their weather-related dis-
aster losses as a result of the North’s historical emissions of greenhouse
gases. 
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event (as Mechler and Pflug (2002), and Mechler (2004) have
demonstrated in the case of Honduras).  Cycling variability howev-
er means that extreme weather events cannot be treated as statisti-
cally independent ones governed by an exponential distribution.
Indeed, extreme events may be clustered in time, and clustering
implies that losses over a shorter interval can lead to ruin even
though individual losses are relatively small (MacDonald, 1999).
Therefore, development of strategies to cope with this variability
responds to efficiency criteria, and, at the same time, is beneficial
against possible enhancement of such phenomena caused by
Global Climate Change.
3.    RISK AND THE RATE OF CHANGE
Another factor of risk, which probably had too low attention
in disaster research, is the rate of change.  As early as 1994, Bella
et al. warned of the limitations in current global change research
when restricted to steady state effects, in which some regions may
gain and others loose.  The most serious risks may arise from cli-
matic transitions and possible consequent disorders.  The authors
recognized that with rapid changes “society would have to cope
with physical, social and ecological systems that no longer fit the
environments in which they evolved”.  This might result in three
types of risk: 
?Technological Risks.  Structures such as dams adequately
designed for present conditions might prove insufficient for
future ones;
?Social Risks.  Unprecedented global population shifts beyond
national and regional boundaries;
?Ecological Risks.  Changes in the frequency and severity of
diseases, pest outbreaks, etc.
Social and technological responses were classified as “Mild”
to “Catastrophic”.  The former might not be distinguished from
dynamics without climate changes; whereas the latter could esca-
late up to desperate population migrations, revolutionary political
changes, crisis and wars. 
Consideration of the differential rate of change as a cause of
disasters may not be restricted to climate.  An interesting pictorial
model used to study the “changes” is the Five- Store Pagoda
Model (Okada and Tatano, 2000; Okada, 2001), which identifies a
number of different layers which make up the complex socio-tech-
nical systems that may breakdown in a disaster.  The lower the
layer, the slower the speed of change of this component.
Mismatches between layers can provoke/ aggravate a disaster.  At
the top layer, everyday activities have a much greater rate of
change than that of the building environment which normally
adapts itself, after a certain delay, to new needs.  Infrastructures
follow these changes.  If destructive events occur when infrastruc-
tures have not yet completely adapted to economic activities and,
therefore, are not sufficiently reliable and “redundant”, damage
done to infrastructure networks may have long lasting effects on
the recovery process, or even nullify development efforts.  Even
longer periods are needed to change the “culture” layer.  A mis-
match can have serious consequences if a society is not yet pre-
pared to cope with threats linked to changes induced by new tech-
nologies (side effects surprise); as well as “resistance” to the too
rapid introduction of imported socio-cultural behavior (demoniza-
tion of ‘globalization’, whichever form it may assume, hence ter-
rorism).  As an example, consequences of human activities on the
natural environment (bottom layer) may be very slow (e.g., global
warming) but also very slow (if not impossible) to reverse.
Perturbations of the natural and socio-cultural environments are
reasons for major disasters.
4.    EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND UNCERTAINTIES
Whereas the resilience and capacity of a society must be
established from the perspective of climatic variability and possi-
ble future changes, a large uncertainty in coping with actual events
“is the contradiction between the increasing ability to prognosti-
cate the occurrence of these phenomena at a global scale and the
difficulty of predicting particular impacts at the local scale”
(Lavell, 2004).  The development and implementation of early
warning systems with improvement of data acquisition and fore-
casting capability  and, what is most important, their integration in
policy and ‘people-centered’ design and implementation (Basher,
2004), therefore, should be given high priority.
Early warning systems and the anticipation of proximate haz-
ards are not limited to climatic events.  The lack of such systems
dramatically increased the number of victims of the 2005 tsunami
in Southeast Asia.  Unlike other timely warning areas, seismic
warning is not yet a mature science.  Improvements in hazard
assessment however have already resulted in time-dependent seis-
mic hazard mapping (Sokolov et al. 2003), and anticipation of
proximate earthquakes is producing integrated efforts for mitiga-
tion and preparedness, such as the Tonankai initiative in Japan
(Kameda 2004, Okada, 2004).  In addition, the 4th IIASA-DPRI
Forum panel on advances in seismic hazards assessment showed
that the accuracy of timely earthquake warnings is improving, even
if predictions to date are not reliable or accurate enough to be used
routinely for public warning.  On the one hand, prediction methods
[Kossobokov (2004): Peresan et al. (2204); and Panza et al.
(2004)] have passed scientific testing in real-time prediction exper-
iments and their improvements deserve more general attention; on
the other, they could be used for improving seismic risk prepared-
ness and prioritizing mitigation. 
Once again, a fundamental attention must be paid to the man-
agement of uncertainties in early warning systems and in the com-
munication of major hazards, as well as to conflicts in decisions
with respect to financial costs and social disruption.  To be effec-
tive, the warning process should utilize the integrated effort of sci-
entists, administrators, and the public (Alexander, 2004).  Only by
such integration, and in presence of high social cohesion, can sys-
tems efficient in the case of real hazard occurrences and robust
enough to resist disruption from false alarms be implemented.
Despite the time that has elapsed since its proposal, the in-field
work of De Marchi et al. (1993), after interviews with leading
responsible persons in emergency planning and management,
resulted in a classification that still now provides a very useful
framework for understanding the nature of the uncertainties to be
managed.  In addition to scientific uncertainties (difficulties in risk
assessment or forecasting), the other dominating uncertainties are
?situational: inadequate available information in relation to the
necessary decisions 




?societal: high when there is little integration between the pub-
lic and concerned institutions
?institutional: the withholding of information by agencies for
bureaucratic reasons
?proprietary: contested rights to know, warn or conceal (espe-
cially these concerning technological risks).
In the Tonankai project, Tsuchiya (2004) showed how daily
losses caused by traffic interruption after a seismic warning are
much higher than the actual daily losses after an earthquake.  This
certainly concretely affects only a subset of the communication
network, and he doubted the practicability of such a warning.  A
very dramatic case is that of the emergency plan to evacuate
800,000 people from the very congested area around Mt.  Vesuvius
in Italy.  In that case evacuation is foreseen to be for a long time
being impossible to return once the anticipated explosive eruption
takes place.  Therefore, people will be dislocated to different
Italian prefectures for shelter and assistance.  The costs and risks
of false alarms would be enormous.  The associated legal/moral
uncertainties are therefore overwhelming3. 
5. DISASTER RISK AND DIFFERENTIAL
VULNERABILITY
Whereas a casual relation between global warming and the
increased severity and frequency of climatic disasters is still not
clear, there is no doubt that anthropogenic factors enhance vulnera-
bility and exacerbate disaster severity.  The burden is unequally
distributed.  Whereas economic losses are greater in industrialized
countries, poor countries bear the greater burdens of natural disas-
ters.  Up to 95 percent of the deaths in recent disasters have
occurred in poor countries.  The global pattern of economic losses
also is uneven, and, relative to GNP, the poor suffer disproportion-
ately more financial costs.  As Shah et al. (2001) noted; it is only
in poor countries that drought turns to famine often resulting in
population displacement, suffering, and loss of life.  The social and
economic costs of such occurrences may undo, in just a day or
month, the achievements of years of development efforts.  In this,
the role of infrastructure losses is very important (Freeman and
Pflug, 2003).
More and more, researchers are focusing the attention on “dif-
ferential vulnerabilities” (Comfort et al. 1999, Tobin 1999), popu-
lation aging resulting in larger vulnerabilities (Mitchell, 2003),
violence as generator of vulnerability to natural hazards (Wisner
2003) and ‘hidden victims of disaster’ (Hoffman 2003).  The pat-
tern of differential vulnerability suggests a fractal structure; spa-
tially differentiated exposure to hazards and an uneven capability
in coping with them from the global to local level, thereby consti-
tuting a serious problem from the environmental justice perspec-
tive.  This has been made clear by flood risk case studies done in
Boston and Buenos Aries, the emphasis having been on improving
the circumstances of the most disadvantaged sectors of the public
in both cities (Suarez 2002). 
If poverty is the major cause of vulnerability to disasters,
fighting poverty means fighting disasters; but disasters may
impede any chance of development; a vicious circle that must be
broken.  To do this, a better understanding of the natures of disas-
ters is needed.  A disaster should be characterized as a vector of
multiple indicators for hazards and consequences, a significant but
often neglected dimension being the disaster capability of exacer-
bating (and/or creating new)  inequities.  Neither severity scales
nor disaster records indicate how losses are distributed or which
parties are excluded from the recovery process.  These few
thoughts were expressed when discussing the rational for the
Kyoto IDRM Forum (Amendola, 2003).  A recent study of disaster
indicators and their application to Latin American countries
(Cardona ed. 2004) shows significant improvement in the charac-
terization of disasters for the design of integrated risk manage-
ment.  It is worthwhile to summarize the rational for the proposed
system of indicators. 
The authors recognize the difficulty in achieving effective dis-
aster risk management given the lack of a comprehensive concep-
tual framework that facilitates assessment and evaluation from an
integrated, multidisciplinary perspective.  “Disaster risk manage-
ment needs risk dimensioning, and risk sizing signifies to take into
account not only the expected physical damage, victims and eco-
nomic equivalent loss, but also social, organizational and institu-
tional factors”.  Current indices and evaluations are not based on a
holistic approach that is adequate for the diverse nature of deci-
sions to be taken (of the different planning and control agencies
responsible for the economy, housing, environment, public works,
etc.) and diverse decision-makers (a mayor or a community at the
local level vs. central government) involved.  There is the need to
understand how vulnerability is generated and how it accumulates.
Different degrees of detail are needed on a micro-social or micro-
territorial scale than aggregation and decisions on macro scales. 
To achieve cross-national comparisons from 1980 to 2000, a
proposed system of indicators has been benchmarked for different
periods and countries.  It is comprised of four groups of indepen-
dent indicators:
1. The Disaster Deficit Index, DDI, deals with economic loss
that a country might suffer when faced with a catastrophic
event and the implications in terms of the resources required
to confront the situation.
2. The Local Disaster Index, LDI, attempts to represent spatial
variability and risk dispersion in a country resulting from
small and recurrent events.  This index represents the prone-
ness of a country to low level or small-scale disasters and
their cumulative impact.
3. The Prevalent Vulnerability Index, PVI, characterizes prevail-
ing vulnerability conditions reflected in exposure in disaster-
prone areas, socioeconomic fragility, and the lack of social
resilience; aspects that favor the direct impact as well as the
indirect, intangible impact in the case of the occurrence of a
hazard event.
4. The Risk Management Index, RMI, measures a country’s per-
formance level of risk management, taking into account the
organization, development, and institutional action taken to
reduce vulnerability, the reduction of the loss in case of haz-
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3 As discussed elsewhere (Amendola, 1998), this emergency plan was the
first mitigation action after many years during which risk was ‘removed’
by the public and administrations, and uncontrolled development was
allowed.  Incentives now are being offered (up to 30,000 Euros per fami-
ly) to move away from the most seriously menaced areas.  To be effec-
tive, such measures should be accompanied by the creation of new attrac-
tion poles for economic activities far from the hazardous zones.
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ard events, response preparedness in case of crisis, and effi-
ciency of recovery (P. 4 – Cardona ed. 2004).
The reader is referred to the published report, which includes
quantification exercises made for different countries in Central and
South America.  This system of indicators should provide a signifi-
cant step forwards in representing risk, given its strength in the
ability to disaggregate results and identify factors that should guide
decision making of different scales.  Also included in PVI are such
“Indicators of Socio-economic Fragility (SF)”, as poverty, human
insecurity, dependency, illiteracy, social disparities, unemploy-
ment, inflation, debt, and environmental deterioration (P. 40,
Cardona ed. 2004):
?Human Poverty Index, 
?Dependents as a proportion of the working age population
?Social disparity, concentration of income.
?Unemployment as % of the total labor force.
?Inflation, food prices in annual %
?Dependency of GDP growth on agriculture in annual %
?Debt servicing as % of the GDP.
?Human-induced Soil Degradation.
As simple aggregate loss indicators can no longer be consid-
ered sufficient to characterize disaster impacts, long-term conse-
quences of disasters should include the investigation of differential
effects; losses in a particular sector or activity need to be studied
keeping in mind possible beneficial impacts on competitors.  A
disaster results in changes, and, in any change there may be losers
and winners.  Permanent losses in one zone of a country might be
accompanied by economic improvements in other zones; e.g. in
addition to studying the long term effects of the earthquake on
Kobe Port activities (Kajitani et al. 2001), it would be of great
interest to accompany the study with insights into what was hap-
pening in other Japanese ports (or elsewhere). 
Changes should be studied in depth, in all their multiple
dimensions; organizational learning (Comfort and Sungu, 2002),
social response attitudes (Sugiman 2002), land use (Kakumoto et
al. 2002), etc.; but, a disaster also may mobilize ‘latent’ human
resources.  As an example, Friuli, one of the poorest Italian
regions, was impacted by a severe earthquake in 1976, but is now
part of the Northeast ‘economic wonder’ in Italy.  This is not
explained simply by the resources allocated for its reconstruction,
but more deeply by the new spirit of the communities severely
affected by the earthquakes.  This of course is possible when the
effects are localized and absorbed by resources existing some-
where else in a country or community of countries.  This kind of
investigation adds knowledge which will help make communities
more resilient to disasters. 
In addition, changes due to the effects of globalization and
increasing interdependence should be the subject of greater in-
depth analyses, because of the implications for disaster risk man-
agement.  Allmann (2000) warned that the Chi-Chi earthquake
showed the vulnerability and interdependence of a modern, net-
worked, high-tech society, and that effects of earthquakes can no
longer be considered local; damage to production facilities in other
locations would have an impact of very different dimensions, and
in a worst case scenario of global dimensions the insurance sector
could be much more severely affected. 
As a different example, the human suffering pattern in the
recent Southeast Asia tsunami was of unprecedented global dimen-
sion.  Human losses were not only in the affected countries but
throughout the globe.  In northern Europe, the number of victims,
mostly tourists, was probably greater than those in all natural dis-
asters suffered at home for decades.  Also in Europe, immigrants
from that region suffered severe loss of life in their families living
in the directly involved countries.  Such global dimension accounts
for the general mobilization of immediate aid, and the long-term
engagements in early warning systems (hopefully to be fulfilled).
6.    INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
Uncertainties about future changes, the social disruption that
inequalities can create, and increasing interdependencies of losses
and suffering show that disaster risk cannot be viewed simply as a
national issue.  Unfortunately, increasing awareness is not yet
reflected in strong institutional arrangements, not even within the
European Union which places a very strong emphasis on environ-
mental protection and related technological accidents but which
did not enter the fight against natural disasters in its legal frame-
work for common actions of member countries.
Moreover, even at the national level, disaster risk manage-
ment requires integrated efforts not only with respect to the multi-
plicity of physical hazards, but in establishing measures to manage
risks so that they are integrated within the planning and manage-
ment of cities and regions, and to mitigate losses to achieve a bet-
ter resilience to disasters.  However, we are still far from these
objectives.  Every country lacks a coherent framework for coping
with natural and man-made disaster risks by means of a consistent
all-hazards approach.  There also is an urgent need for consensus
building within the research community towards a desirable gener-
al framework4.
Regulations, financial provisions (think of the flood insurance
program in the USA, where there is no parallel approach in that
country for such other risks as wild fires and earthquakes), physi-
cal planning and control agencies separately act on specific kinds
of risks, mostly without uniform requirements and criteria.
Generally, only emergency planning and rescue agencies attempt
an all-hazards approach, but response represents only one step in
the risk management process which should start from hazard iden-
tification, prevention, mitigation, preparedness, early warning and
response to end up with provision for loss compensation and
recovery.  In each of these other steps, competencies generally are
distributed among different organizations, each dealing with
selected issues relevant to specific hazards, often without coopera-
tion, and disaster risks are not adequately integrated in planning
activities.  Furthermore, very seldom in the planning and risk man-
agement process is community awareness and participation
enhanced in such a way as to become an essential component of
risk prevention and mitigation policy (Shaw 2004).
Gopalakrishnan and Okada (2003) maintain that current institu-
tions are largely technocratic and bureaucratic, they neglect social
and cultural symbiosis, and for this reason there has been far too
little implementation of disaster mitigation measures.  They draw
attention to the importance of coordinated legislation, cultural val-
ues, and the recognition that disasters are social constructions.
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4 See report on Discussion Group 5 in the Proceedings of the 2nd IIASA- DPRI
Forum.
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They identify eight key elements for new institutions;
awareness/access, autonomy, affordability, accountability, adapt-
ability, efficiency, equity and sustainability. 
The limits of the market call against deregulation4; however,
to be effective regulations need to be implementable, but difficul-
ties in implementation are evident, even in developed countries
(Alesch and Petak 2001).  This cannot be the result only of con-
flicting long-term versus short-term objectives; the weighting of
immediate needs or wishes vs. devoting resources (when avail-
able,) to mitigation of future risks.  Analysis of the complete pat-
tern of causes and remedial measures deserve further research.  In
this spirit, the IIASA-DPRI Forum instituted reflection on
‘Implementation Science’ (Wisner 2004) aimed “at the systematic
study of the relationship between the production of the knowledge
necessary for prevention or mitigation of loss due to hazards and
the successful implementation or use of that knowledge”.
7.    SOME CONCLUSIONS
This short review derives from a very subjective perspective
on lessons learnt and highlights of the IIASA- DPRI discussion
forum.  A different perspective would focus on other aspects worth
discussion and provide the reader some different starting points for
new research.
It raises - without responding - a number of questions, and
proposes a few suggestions:
?Not only would North-South solidarity compensate for effects
of possible human induced climate changes but would be ben-
eficial because of its contribution to reducing international
social disruptions.  As Wisner (2003) proposes, links should
be established between disaster risk research community and
research for peace (Friedenforschung);
?Resilience to cyclic climate fluctuations already is a major
challenge, calling for long term measures, which also would
guard against possible increases in rate and intensity of
weather- related extreme events caused by global climate
change;
?Attention must be paid to the rate of change, and the marked
interdependencies of losses; 
?Early warning systems are effective when people centered and
in a clear institutional frame that is based on trust and social
cohesion, keeping in mind the nature of the uncertainties
involved;
?Better characterization of disaster risks is possible via indica-
tors that present in a sufficient degree of detail the risk situa-
tion tailored to diverse decisions and decision makers.  Such
indicators are being developed to include differential vulnera-
bilities;
?Studies of changes occurring after disasters should aim at
understanding how to improve resilience and reduce exacer-
bation of inequalities;
?Wide-scoping reflection is needed to obtain institutions that
are able to approach disaster risk management holistically for
the successful implementation of regulations and knowledge.
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